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Abstract
This paper explores a licensors choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a xed fee
when her innovation is covered by a weak patent, i.e. a patent that is likely to be invali-
dated by a court if challenged. Using a general model where the nature of competition is
not specied, we show that the patent holder prefers to use a per-unit royalty scheme if
the strategic e¤ect of an increase in a potential licensees unit cost on the aggregate equi-
librium prot is positive. To show the mildness of the latter condition, we establish that
it holds in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) oligopoly with homegenous (resp. heterogenous)
products under very general assumptions on the demands faced by rms. As a byproduct
of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by o¤ering some new insights
of independent interest regarding the e¤ects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand
equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Early theoretical works on licensing (Kamien and Tauman 1984, 1986) have concluded that
a patent holder should charge a xed fee rather than per-unit royalties when licensing an
innovation. This nding is however in sharp contrast with what is observed in the real world:
Per-unit royalties seem to be more often used than xed fees (see e.g Taylor and Silberstone,
1973; Rostoker, 1984).1 Various reasons have been put forward to explain the prevalence
of per-unit royalties in practice, including risk aversion (Bousquet et al. 1998), product
di¤erentiation (Muto, 1993; Wang and Yang, 1999; Poddar and Sinha, 2004; Stamatopoulos
and Tauman, 2007), asymmetry of information (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler and
Pérez-Castrillo, 1991; Beggs, 1992; Poddar and Sinha, 2002; Sen, 2005), moral hazard (Macho-
Stadler et al., 1996; Choi, 2001), incumbent innovator (Shapiro, 1985; Wang, 1998, 2002;
Kamien and Tauman, 2002; Sen, 2002; Sen and Tauman, 2007), prots and sales objective
through delegation (Saracho, 2002), leadership structure (Kabiraj, 2004) or variation in the
quality of innovation (Rockett, 1990).
A common feature of all those papers is that patents are viewed as ironclad rights, the
validity of which is unquestionable. However this contrasts with the observation that many
patents have been challenged by third parties and actually invalidated by courts (Allison and
Lemley, 1998). Furthermore, many authors have argued that patents should be considered as
probabilistic rights because they do not give the right to exclude but rather a more limited
right to "try to exclude" by asserting the patent in court (Ayres and Klemperer, 1999; Shapiro,
2003; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005).
Most commentators agree that many "innovations" are granted patent protection even
though they probably do not meet patentability standards. Such issued patents are weak
in the sense that they are likely to be invalidated by a court if challenged.2 The prolifer-
ation of those questionable patents can be explained by several reasons. First, the major
patent o¢ ces (USPTO, EPO and JPO) have insu¢ cient resources to ensure an e¤ective re-
view process for the huge (and growing) number of patent applications (IDEI report, 2006).
1Available data on patent licensing is limited and scattered because the disclosure of licensing contracts
crucially depends on rms policy. Most rms elect not to make such information public. The empirical
investigations by Annand and Khanna (2000) and Vonortas and Kim (2004) emphasize the factors that a¤ect
the likelihood of rms to engage in licensive agreements but are less informative on the choice of the licensing
scheme.
2The notion of "weak patent" has at least two di¤erent meanings in the literature (see Ginarte and Park,
1997, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2010). A rst meaning is that a patent is considered weak when it
gives to its holder a low protection against imitators and other potential infringers, either because the patents
scope is badly dened or because the geographical protection extends to countries in which the enforcement of
intellectual property rights is low. Another meaning is that a patent is weak when it is likely that it does not
satisfy at least one of the patentability standards (novelty, non obviousness, utility, patentable subject matter).
Therefore, it may be invalidated by a court if it is challenged by a third party. This paper focuses on that
second meaning (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005).
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Second, the patentability standards, in particular novelty and non-obviousness, are di¢ cult
to assess especially for new patentable subject matters. Third, the incentives provided to
patent o¢ ce examiners are inadequate for making them reject the applications that do not
meet the standards (Farrell and Merges, 2004; Langinier and Marcoul, 2009). Finally, the
patentable subject matters are still debated and di¤er according to continents (Guellec and
van Pottelsberghe, 2007).
In this paper, we compare the per-unit royalty scheme and the xed fee scheme for the
licensing of weak patents, hence extending the literature on the comparison between these
two licensing mechanisms for ironclad patents. Our main contribution is to provide a novel
justication, based on the uncertainty over patent validity, for the use of per-unit royalties
instead of xed fees in licensing agreements. More specically, we establish that, for weak
patents, the patent holder is better o¤ using the optimal per-unit royalty licensing scheme
deterring patent litigation rather than the optimal xed fee licensing scheme deterring patent
litigation if the strategic e¤ect of an increase in one rms marginal cost on the aggregate
equilibrium prots is positive. We show that this condition is mild in that it holds under
very general conditions for two of the most usual imperfect competition frameworks: Cournot
oligopoly with homegenous goods and Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods. As a
byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by o¤ering some new
insights of independent interest regarding the e¤ects of cost increases on Cournot and Bertrand
equilibria.
The closest papers to ours are Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009)
who also deal with the licensing of weak patents in the shadow of patent litigation, though
with objectives that are di¤erent from the present papers. In each of those two papers,
the licensor is assumed to o¤er two-part tari¤ licensing contracts but some of the results
are derived under a simplifying ad hoc assumption on the shape of the licensing revenue
function which immediately ensures that, for weak patents, pure per-unit royalty licenses are
optimal from the patent holders perspective in the class of two-part tari¤ licensing contracts
(with non-negative xed fees) deterring litigation and, therefore, makes the analysis easier.
Our main result may be seen as a corollary of the latter optimality statement, but in sharp
contrast to the former papers, it is obtained under a weak condition which has a natural
economic interpretation and is shown to hold with broad generality in standard oligopoly
models with general demand functions (as are all the assumptions on the equilibrium prot
functions made in our reduced-form model of competition). Therefore, our result that the
licensor of a weak patent is better o¤ charging per-unit royalties rather than xed fees is
arguably robust, especially as we also show that it holds in two extensions of the baseline
model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 characterizes the optimal license for each of the two schemes from the patent holders
3
perspective. In Section 4 we derive our main result on the comparison between the two
licensing schemes for weak patents. In Section 5, we extend the analysis, rst by including
litigation costs borne by the challenger and, second, by considering a patent holder that
is active on the downstream market. In section 6, we show that the general assumptions
made on the equilibrium prots in our reduced-form model of competition and the (su¢ cient)
condition under which the per-unit royalty scheme is preferred over the xed fee scheme by the
patent holder (be it an outsider or an insider) hold under mild conditions for both a Cournot
oligopoly with homogenous goods and a Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods. Section
7 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an industry consisting of n  2 symmetric risk-neutral rms producing at a
marginal cost c (xed production costs are assumed to be zero). A rm P outside the industry
holds a patent covering a technology that, if used, allows a rm to reduce its marginal cost
from c to c  :
We consider the following three-stage game:
First stage: The patent holder P proposes to all rms a licensing contract whereby a
licensee can use the patented technology against the payment of a per-unit royalty r 2 [0; ]
or a xed fee F  0:3
Second stage: The n rms in the industry simultaneously and independently decide
whether to purchase a license. If a rm does not accept the license o¤er, it can challenge
the patents validity before a court.4 The outcome of such a trial is uncertain: with probabil-
ity  > 0 the patent is upheld by the court and with probability 1   it is invalidated. Hence,
the parameter  may be interpreted as the patents strength. If the patent is upheld, then a
rm that does not purchase the license uses the old technology, thus producing at marginal
cost c whereas a rm that accepted the license o¤er uses the new technology and pay the
per-unit royalty r or the xed fee F to the patent holder. If the patent is invalidated, all the
rms, including those that accepted the license o¤er can use for free the new technology and
their common marginal cost is c  .5
3Following Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009), we focus on take-it-or-leave-it
license o¤ers.
4 If the patent is granted by the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO), one may alternatively assume that a rm
can challenge the patents validity before the EPO. Indeed, any patent issued by the EPO can be opposed
by a third party. The notice of opposition must be led in writing at the EPO within nine months from the
publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent.
5Following Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009), we ignore litigation costs in our
baseline model. As argued in the former paper, understanding how the inclusion of litigation costs would
a¤ect the terms on which a patent is licensed in the shadow of litigation requires to extend the model to more
general bargaining, which may be quite complex as we have multiple competing rms bargaining with the
patent holder. However, in an extension to the baseline model we show that our main results hold - and are
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The n rms produce under the cost structure inherited from the second stage. We do not
specify the type of competition that occurs. We only assume that there exists a unique equi-
librium of the competition game for any cost structure and we set some general assumptions
on the equilibrium prot functions. For this purpose, denote e(k; c) (respectively i(k; c))
the equilibrium prot function, gross of any potential xed cost (e.g xed license fee), of a
rm producing with marginal cost c  c (respectively with marginal cost c) when k  n rms
produce at marginal cost c and the remaining n  k rms produce at the marginal cost c:
We now make the following general assumptions for any given n and k = 1; :::; n:
A1. The equilibrium prots of an e¢ cient rm and an ine¢ cient rm, i.e. e(k; c) and
i(k; c) respectively, are both continuously di¤erentiable in c over the subset of [0; c] in which
i(c; k) > 0: Furthermore, the function c! qe (n; c) is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly
positive over [0; c].
A2. If the rms are symmetric (in terms of e¢ ciency), an identical increase in all rms
marginal costs leads to a decrease in each rms equilibrium prot: @
e
@c (n; c) < 0.
A3. An ine¢ cient rms equilibrium prot is increasing in the e¢ cient rmsmarginal cost:
If i(k; c) > 0 then @
i
@c (k; c) > 0 and if 
i(k; c) = 0 then i(k; c0) = 0 for any c0 < c:
A4. A rms prot is decreasing in the number of e¢ cient rms in the industry: for any c < c
and any k < n it holds that e(k; c) > e(k + 1; c) and i(k; c)  i(k + 1; c):
A5. A rms prot increases as it moves from the subgroup of ine¢ cient rms to the subgroup
of e¢ cient rms: for any c < c and any k < n it holds that i(k; c) < e(k + 1; c)
As we shall argue in precise detail in Section 6, all these assumptions are satised with
broad generality in the standard oligopoly models with general demand functions, the main
restrictions being those needed to ensure existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy equilib-
rium (such as Cournot or Bertrand equilibrium). In particular, these assumptions are clearly
satised for instance for the widely used settings of Cournot competition with homogeneous
goods and linear demand and Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated goods and linear de-
mands.
3 Optimal license deterring litigation
If litigation occurs then, with probability , the patent is upheld by the court (thus becoming
an ironclad right) and, with probability 1 ; it is invalidated and the technology can be used
for free by all rms. Thus, if the patent holder expects its license o¤er to trigger litigation,
it should make an o¤er that maximizes its revenues should the patent be ruled valid by the
court. The patent holder would then essentially act as if the patent were ironclad, and the
determination of the terms on which the technology is patented under each licensing scheme
actually strengthened - if we introduce small legal costs (or administrative fees) to be incurred by a challenger
of the patents validity.
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would amount to the analysis of licensing o¤ers for ironclad patents, which has already been
done extensively in the literature. We therefore consider in what follows only the class of
license o¤ers deterring litigation, for which the comparison of the two schemes cannot be
derived trivially from that under ironclad patent protection.6
3.1 Optimal per-unit royalty license
Let us rst examine a rms incentives to challenge the patents validity when the patent
holder makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a per-unit royalty r. A rm that decides
not to purchase a license is always (weakly) better o¤ challenging the patents validity: If no
other rm challenges the patents validity it gets a payo¤ i(n 1; c +r)+(1  )e(n; c )
which is strictly greater than the prot i(n 1; c +r) it would get by not challenging, and
if some other rm challenges the patents validity then it is indi¤erent between challenging and
not. Thus, a situation where one or more rms do not buy a license and no rm challenges the
patents validity can never be an equilibrium of the second stage subgame. We can therefore
state that a license o¤er will deter litigation if and only if it is accepted by all rms.
Let us now write the condition under which all rms accepting the license o¤er is an
equilibrium of the second stage subgame. A rm anticipating that all other rms will purchase
a license gets a prot equal to e(n; c    + r) if it accepts the license o¤er. If it does not
and challenges the patents validity then with probability ; the patent is upheld by the court
and the challenger gets a prot equal to i(n  1; c  + r) and, with probability 1  , the
challenger gets a prot of e(n; c   ) (and so do all other rms). Thus, a rm challenging
the patents validity when all other rms accept the license o¤er, gets an expected prot of
i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  ): Therefore, all rms accepting the license o¤er is an
equilibrium if and only if:
e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  ) (1)
The equilibria of the second stage subgame for each value of r are presented in detail in the
Appendix. In particular, it is shown that whenever Condition (1) holds, all rms buying a
license is the unique equilibrium.7 The next proposition characterizes the per-unit royalty
license that maximizes the patent holders licensing revenues subject to constraint (1).
Proposition 1 For su¢ ciently weak patents, the optimal per-unit royalty license accepted by
6 In doing so, we follow Farrell and Shapiro (2008) who also focus on the licenses that are not litigated
because they aim to investigate the social costs of the uncertainty over patent validity (which is resolved if
litigation occurs). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the vast majority of patent disputes are settled
using licensing agreements before the court decides whether the patent is valid or not (see for instance Allison
and Lemley, 1998 and Lemley and Shapiro, 2005)
7We assume throughout the paper that whenever a potential licensee is indi¤erent between buying a license
or challenging the patents validity, it buys a license.
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all rms, thus deterring any litigation, involves the payment of the royalty rate r () dened
as the unique solution in r to the following equation:
e(n; c  + r) = i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  )
Proof. See Appendix.
3.2 Optimal xed fee license
For a license o¤er involving the payment of a xed fee F to be accepted by all rms, the
following condition must hold:
e(n; c  )  F  i(n  1; c  ) + (1  )e(n; c  )
which can be rewritten as:
F   e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  ) (2)
The equilibria of the second stage subgame for each value of F are presented in precise detail
in the Appendix. In particular, it is shown that under condition (2) all rms accepting the
license o¤er is the unique equilibrium for su¢ ciently weak patents. The next proposition
characterizes the optimal xed fee license deterring litigation.
Proposition 2 The optimal xed fee license accepted by all rms, thus deterring any litiga-
tion, involves the payment of the fee F () = 

e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  ) :
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Optimal licensing scheme
Before stating formally our main result let us explain why one could expect a high probability
of invalidation (i.e. small ) to increase the attractiveness of per-unit royalties with respect
to xed fees relative to the case of ironclad patents (i.e.  = 1). As shown in Farrell and
Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009), the use of per-unit royalties may allow the
patent holder to deter litigation while getting licensing revenues which are higher than the
expected licensing revenues it would earn if the patent validity issue were resolved before
licensing. The reason is that the free rider problem arising from the public good nature of
patent invalidation combined with the non-linearity of equilibrium prots with respect to per-
unit royalties can make the licensing revenues grow more than proportionally with respect to
the patent strength  for small values of this parameter (i.e. for weak patents). Proposition 2
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however shows that this cannot happen if a license involving the payment of a xed fee only
is used instead: the optimal xed fee deterring litigation is linear in the patent strength 
which makes the expected licensing revenues the patent holder derives from the optimal xed
fee license deterring litigation also linear in : In the light of these remarks, one might expect
that even in a setting where a patent holder would have used the xed fee licensing scheme
if its patent were certainly valid, it could prefer to use the per-unit royalty scheme in case its
patent is weak.
The next proposition provides a su¢ cient condition for the per-unit royalty scheme to be
preferred over the xed fee scheme by the holder of a weak patent.
Proposition 3 The optimal per-unit royalty scheme deterring litigation provides higher li-
censing revenues than the optimal xed fee scheme deterring litigation for su¢ ciently weak
patents if :
@e
@c
(n; c  ) >  qe(n; c  ) (3)
Moreover, the reverse holds if the reverse strict inequality is veried.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand why condition (3) matters for the comparison of the licensing revenues
under the two schemes, it is useful to consider the sharing of the total revenues generated
by the innovation under each licensing scheme between the patent holder and the licensees.
Denote ~Pr () (resp. ~PF ()) the patent holders revenues under the optimal per-unit royalty
(resp. xed fee) license deterring litigation and ~r () (resp. ~F ()) the di¤erence between
pre-innovation and post-innovation prots for each licensee under the optimal per-unit royalty
(resp. xed fee) license. The equilibrium total revenues generated by the innovation are
~Vr () = ~Pr ()+n ~r () (resp. ~VF () = ~PF ()+n ~F ()) under the per-unit royalty scheme
(resp. the xed fee scheme).
Let us rst compare ~Vr () and ~VF (). We have:
~Vr ()  ~VF () = n [e(n; c  + r ()) + r () qe(n; c  + r ())  e(n; c)]  n [e(n; c  )  e(n; c)]
= n [e(n; c  + r ())  e(n; c  ) + r () qe(n; c  + r ())]
The latter is positive if the loss in market prots e(n; c  + r ())  e(n; c  ) is overcom-
pensated by the per-rm licensing revenues r () qe(n; c +r ()): Since ~Vr (0)  ~VF (0) = 0, a
su¢ cient condition for ~Vr ()  ~VF () to be positive for  su¢ ciently small is that its derivative
at  = 0 is positive. Since:
d
d
h
~Vr ()  ~VF ()
i
=0
= nr0 (0)

@e
@c
(n; c  ) + qe(n; c  )

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and r0 (0) > 0; condition (3) ensures that the total revenues ~Vr () generated by the optimal
per-unit royalty license are higher than the total revenues ~VF () generated by the optimal
xed fee license for  su¢ ciently small.
To derive the comparison between the licensing revenues ~Pr () and ~PF () under the two
schemes, we need to compare ~r () and ~F () as well. We have:
~r ()  ~F () = [e(n; c  + r ())  e(n; c)]  [e(n; c  )  F ()  e(n; c)]
= i(n  1; c  + r ()) + (1  )e(n; c  )  e(n; c  )
+

e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  )
= 

i(n  1; c  + r ())  i(n  1; c  ) > 0
Thus, each licensee is better o¤ under the per-unit royalty scheme, which makes the compar-
ison between ~Pr () = ~Vr ()   n ~r () and ~PF () = ~VF ()   n ~F () a priori ambiguous.
Note however that the positive e¤ect of the patent strength  on ~r ()   ~F () is second
order for  su¢ ciently small (since dd
h
~r ()  ~F ()
i
=0
= 0) while the e¤ect of  on
~Vr ()   ~VF () is positive and rst order under condition (3). Thus, for  su¢ ciently small,
the licensing revenues generated by the per-unit royalty scheme grow faster (with the patent
strength) than those resulting from the use of a xed fee scheme, which yields the result.
Interpretation. Condition (3) means that the strategic e¤ect of an identical increase in the
marginal cost of all (symmetric) rms on the rmsprots is positive. This interpretation
results from the following decomposition (where we use the generic variable c instead of c  
as the second argument of the considered functions) :
@e
@c
(n; c) =  qe(n; c)| {z }
direct effect
+ qe(n; c)
@pe
@c
(n; c) + (pe (n; c)  c) @q
e
@c
(n; c)| {z }
strategic effect
An increase in all rmsmarginal cost c a¤ects their equilibrium prots e (n; c) through two
channels. First, it yields an increase in each rms production costs (for a given output). Sec-
ond, it entails an adjustment of their outputs and/or prices. The rst e¤ect, captured by the
term  qe(n; c); can be interpreted as a direct e¤ect of a marginal cost variation on equilibrium
prots while the second e¤ect, captured by the term qe(n; c)@p
e
@c (n; c)+(p
e (n; c)  c) @qe@c (n; c),
can be interpreted as the strategic e¤ect of cost variation on prots.8
To the best of our knowledge, condition (3) has not been studied in the literature on the
e¤ects of cost variations on oligopolistsprots which has mainly focused on the overall e¤ect
of cost changes on prots (see e.g. Kimmel, 1992; Février and Linnemer 2004). In section 6
we show the mildness of this condition by establishing that it holds under weak assumptions
8This strategic e¤ect can further be split into a price e¤ect captured by the term qe(n; c) @p
e
@c
(n; c) and an
output e¤ect captured by the term (pe(n; c)  c) @qe
@c
(n; c) :
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in two of the most usual competition models, namely Cournot competition with homogenous
goods and Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated goods.
5 Extensions
5.1 Litigation costs
Let us assume in this section that a rm that challenges the patents validity before a court has
to incur some legal costs C  0.9 It is straightforward that the higher those costs the higher
the licensing revenues the patent holder can extract from the licensees without triggering
litigation. This qualitative observation holds under both schemes. However, we show in what
follows that on the quantitative side, the marginal e¤ect of litigation costs on the patent
holders licensing revenues is higher under the per-unit royalty scheme than under the xed
fee scheme if condition (3) holds. This implies that the result in Proposition 1 remains true
- and is actually strenghtened - if the model is extended to include (small) legal costs that
have to be incurred by a challenger.
Suppose rst that the patent holder makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a per-
unit royalty r 2 [0; [ . Note that the inclusion of legal costs in our setting does not a¤ect the
fact that the strategy "not buy a license and not challenge the patents validity" is always
dominated by the strategy "buy a license". Therefore, the only way a patent holder can deter
litigation is to make a license o¤er that is accepted by all rms. This will be the case if and
only if:
e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  )  C
It is easily shown the latter constraint is met if and only if r  r(; C) where r(; C) is the
solution in r to the equation:
e(n; c  + r) = i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  )  C
and that, for  and C su¢ ciently small, the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation
involves the payment of the royalty r(; C) (i.e. the constraint is binding). Note also that
r(; C) is strictly increasing in both its arguments.
Suppose now that the patent holder makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a xed
fee F: Such a license o¤er is accepted by all rms if and only if:
e(n; c  )  F  i(n  1; c  ) + (1  )e(n; c  )  C
9 If we consider opposition before the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) instead of litigation before a court, the
cost C can be interpreted as the administrative fee an opponent to a patent has to pay to the EPO for the
patent to be reexamined.
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and, therefore, the optimal xed fee license deterring litigation involves the payment of the
fee:
F (; C) = 

e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  )+ C
Let us now compare the licensing revenues derived by the patent holder under the two schemes.
Under the optimal per-unit royalty scheme, they are given by
~Pr (; C) = nr (; C) q
e(n; c  + r (; C))
and under the optimal xed fee licensing, they are given by:
~PF (; C) = nFn (; C) = n

e (n; c  )  i (n  1; c  )+ nC
Since ~Pr (0; 0) = ~PF (0; 0) ; a su¢ cient condition for the existence of ~ > 0 and ~C > 0 such
that the inequality ~Pr (; C) > ~PF (; C) hold any  < ~ and C < ~C is that:
@ ~Pr
@
(0; 0) >
@ ~PF
@
(0; 0)
and
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) >
@ ~PF
@C
(0; 0)
The former inequality has already been shown to be equivalent to condition (3). Surprisingly,
the latter inequality is equivalent to condition (3) too. Indeed,
@ ~PF
@C
(0; 0) = n
and
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) = n
@r
@C
(0; 0) qe(n; c  )
Di¤erentiating with respect to C the equation denition r (; C) at point (; C) = (0; 0) ; we
get: @r@C (0; 0) =   1@e
@c
(n;c ) : Thus,
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) =  nq
e(n; c  )
@e
@c (n; c  )
Hence
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) >
@ ~PF
@C
(0; 0)() @
e
@c
(n; c  ) >  qe(n; c  )
Therefore, the result in Proposition 1 is robust - and actually strengthened - in the presence
of small legal costs (borne by the challenger).
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5.2 Internal patentee
Let us consider the case where the patent holder is active in the (downstream) market. More
specically, we assume that one of the n rms operating in the market, say rm 1, gets a
patent on a technology that lowers the unit production cost from c to c  : We assume that
n  3 (as we want to have at least two potential licensees beside the patent holder).
Here again, we assume there exists a unique equilibrium of the competition game for any
cost structure (with identical prots for rms producing at the same unit cost) and we set
some general assumptions on the equilibrium prot functions. We focus on industry cost
structures that can emerge following the licensing game, that is, situations in which: one rm
- the patent holder - produces at unit cost c  , a number k  n  1 of rms - the licensees
- produce at a unit cost c 2 [c  ; c] and the remaining n   k rms - the non-licensees -
produce at unit cost c: We denote by p(k; c), l(k; c) and n(k; c) the equilibrium market
prots of the patent holder, a licensee producing at an e¤ective unit cost c and a non-licensee
respectively.
We make the following general assumptions for any given n and k = 1; :::; n:
A1. The equilibrium prots p(k; c), l(k; c) and n(k; c) are continuously di¤erentiable in c
over [0; c] over the subset of [0; c] in which n(c; k) > 0: Furthermore, the function c! ql (n; c)
is continuously di¤erentiable over the subset of [0; c] in which it is strictly positive.
A2. An identical increase in the costs of all rms but the patent holder decreases each one
of those rmsequilibrium prot: @
l
@c (n  1; c) < 0.
A3. A non-licensees equilibrium prot is increasing in the licenseesunit cost: If n(k; c) > 0
then @
n
@c (k; c) > 0 and if 
n(k; c) = 0 then n(k; c0) = 0 for any c0 < c:
A4. A rms market prot is decreasing in the number of licensees in the industry: for any
c < c and any k < n   1 it holds that p(k; c) > p(k + 1; c); l(k; c) > l(k + 1; c) and
n(k; c)  n(k + 1; c):
A5. A rms market prot increases as it moves from the subgroup of non-licensees to the
subgroup of licensees: for any c < c and any k < n  1 it holds that n(k; c) < l(k + 1; c):
Let us compare the innovators overall prot, i.e. the sum of its market prot and licensing
revenues, under the two licensing schemes.
Under the per-unit royalty scheme, the optimal royalty r () is the solution in r to the
following equation:
l(n  1; c  + r) = n(n  2; c  + r) + (1  )l(n  1; c  )
and the patent holders overall prot is:
~r () = 
p(n  1; c  + r ()) + (n  1) r () ql(n  1; c  + r ())
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Under the xed fee scheme, the optimal fee is given by:
F () = 
h
l(n  1; c  )  n(n  2; c  )
i
and the patent holders overall prot is then:
~F () = 
p(n  1; c  ) + (n  1) 
h
l (n  1; c  )  n (n  2; c  )
i
Since ~r (0) = ~F (0) then ~r () > ~F () for  su¢ ciently small if:
d~r ()
d
j=0> d
~F ()
d
j=0 (4)
which can be rewritten as:
r0 (0)

@p
@c
(n  1; c  ) + (n  1) ql(n; c  )

> (n  1)
h
l (n  1; c  )  n (n  2; c  )
i
because r (0) = 0: Moreover, di¤erentiating at  = 0 the equation dening r (), we get:
r0 (0)
@l
@c
(n  1; c  ) = n (n  2; c  )  l (n  1; c  )
which yields:
r0 (0) =
n (n  2; c  )  l (n  1; c  )
@l
@c (n  1; c  )
Hence, inequality (1) is equivalent to:
n(n 2;c ) l(n 1;c )
@l
@c
(n 1;c )

@p
@c (n  1; c  ) + (n  1) ql(n; c  )

> (n  1) e (n  1; c  )  i (n  2; c  )
which can be rewritten as:
@p
@c
(n  1; c  ) + (n  1) ql(n; c  ) >   (n  1) @
l
@c
(n  1; c  )
that is,
@p
@c
(n  1; c  ) + (n  1) @
l
@c
(n  1; c  ) >   (n  1) ql(n; c  )
Thus, we get the following result:
Proposition 4 The optimal per-unit royalty scheme deterring litigation generates higher
overall prot for the patent holder than the optimal xed fee scheme deterring litigation for
su¢ ciently weak patents if:
@p
@c
(n  1; c  ) + (n  1) @
l
@c
(n  1; c  ) >   (n  1) ql(n; c  ) (5)
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The reverse holds if the reverse strict inequality is satised.
To see how Condition (5) compares to its counterpart when the patent holder is not active
on the market, i.e. Condition (3), let us rewrite both of them with the same notations. For
that purpose, let us denote by  (c1; c2; :::; cn) the sum of all rms equilibrium prots,
i.e. the equilibrium aggregate prot, and qi (c1; c2; :::; cn) rm is output when each rm
j = 1; 2; :::; n produces at unit cost cj :
The su¢ cient condition for the patent holder to prefer the per-unit royalty scheme for
su¢ ciently weak patents when it is not active in the market can be rewritten as (here, c  
is replaced by the generic variable c):
nX
i=1
@
@ci
(c; c; :::; c) >  
nX
i=1
qi (c; c; :::; c) (6)
The su¢ cient condition for the patent holder, denoted as rm k, to prefer the per-unit
royalty scheme for su¢ ciently weak patents when it is active in the market can be rewritten
as (here again, c   is replaced by the generic variable c):
nX
i=1
i6=k
@
@ci
(c; c; :::; c) >  
nX
i=1
i6=k
qi (c; c; :::; c) (7)
Both inequalities have almost the same interpertation: Condition (6) means that the strategic
e¤ect of an identical increase in all rms(common) unit cost on the aggregate prot is positive
and Condition (7) means that the strategic e¤ect of an increase in the costs of all rms but
one on the aggregate prot is positive (rms being equally e¢ cient initially). Note also that
both conditions are implied by the following inequality when it holds for any i = 1; 2; :::; n :
@
@ci
(c; c; :::; c) >  qi (c; c; :::; c) (8)
This condition means that when rms are equally e¢ cient initially, the strategic e¤ect of an
increase in one rms unit cost on the aggregate prot is positive.
We show in what follows that Condition (8) holds under mild conditions for a Cournot
oligopoly (with homogenous products) and a Bertrand oligopoly (with di¤erentiated prod-
ucts). It then follows that both Condition (6) and Condition (7) hold since they are implied
by Condition (8).
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6 Two standard oligopoly applications
In this section, we provide su¢ cient conditions of a general nature on the primitives of the
two most widely used models of imperfect competition, which lead to Assumptions A1-A5
and A1-A5and Condition (8) being veried. Since some of the results below are new to the
oligopoly literature, and of some independent interest, we derive them for fully asymmetric
versions of the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies with linear costs. Accordingly, we also
change the notation as needed, relative to the other parts of the paper.
6.1 Cournot competition with homogenous products
Consider an industry consisting of n rms competing in Cournot fashion. Firm is marginal
cost is denoted ci (xed production costs are assumed to be zero or otherwise sunk). Suppose
the rms face an inverse demand function P () satisfying the following minimal conditions:
C1 P () is twice continuously di¤erentiable and P 0() < 0 whenever P () > 0:
C2 P (0) > ci > P (Q) for Q su¢ ciently high, i = 1; 2; :::; n.
C3 P 0(Q) +QP 00(Q) < 0 for all Q  0 with P () > 0.
These assumptions are quite standard and minimal. C3 is the familiar condition used by
Novshek (1985) to guarantee downward-sloping reaction curves (for any cost function). It is
equivalent to the statement that each rms marginal revenue is decreasing in rivalsoutput
(see Amir, 1996 for an alternative condition).
Firm is prot function and reaction correspondence are (here, Q i =
P
j 6=i qj)
i(qi; Q i) = qi [P (qi +Q i)  ci] and ri(Q i) = argmax
qi0
i(qi; Q i)
The next proposition provides general conditions under which Assumptions A1-A5 and A1-
A5hold for a Cournot oligopoly.
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions C1-C3, the following holds:
(a) There exists a unique Cournot equilibrium.
(b) Firm is equilibrium prot i is di¤erentiable in ci and in cj for any j 6= i:
(c) Firm is equilibrium prot i is decreasing in ci and increasing in cj for any j 6= i:
If in addition, the game is symmetric (with c denoting the unit cost), then
(d) The unique Cournot equilibrium is symmetric.
(e) The equilibrium output q strictly decreases in c.
(f) Per-rm equilibrium prot  decreases in c:
Proof. See Appendix.
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It is straightforward to relate the di¤erent parts of Proposition (5) to AssumptionsA1-A5
and A1-A5. Part (a) is needed to avoid vacuous statements. Assumptions A1 and A1
are implied by part (b) and the proof of part (e). Assumption A2 follows from part (f) and
Assumption A2 follows from combining part (f) with part (c). Assumptions A3 and A3
are implied by part (c). Assumptions A4 and A4follow from repeated applications of part
(c), with one rival rms cost decreasing at a time. Assumptions A5 and A5follow from
part (c).
While Parts (c) and (f) appear quite intuitive, they actually both have a less universal
scope that one might think. Indeed, there is an extensive literature dealing with taxation in
oligopolistic industries and one of its key insights is that a common cost increase can lead
to some rms beneting at the expense of others (Seade, 1985, Kimmel, 1992, and Février
and Linnemer, 2004). More surprisingly, in a symmetric setting, a cost increase may be
benecial to all rms, when the inverse demand function is su¢ ciently convex. In light of this
result, part (f) may be viewed as giving su¢ cient conditions for this counter-intuitive e¤ect
of uniform taxation not to arise.
On the other hand, while the questions addressed in Part (c) do not have any direct
counterparts in the taxation literature, the results from the latter do suggest that the intuitive
conclusions of Part (c) will not hold for su¢ ciently convex inverse demand functions.10
In fact, in the present otherwise quite general framework, it is worth noting that the most
restrictive assumptions made are uniqueness of pure-strategy equilibrium, A2 and A5. In
order to substantiate this claim via an instructive illustration, we provide a well-known class
of demand functions that leads to a violation of each of the three assumptions.
Example. Consider a duopoly industry with inverse demand
P (Q) = Q
  1
 , with
1
2
<  < 1, (9)
which clearly fails Assumption C3.The prot functions are
1(x1; x2) = (q1 + q2)
  1
 x1   c1q1 and 2(q1; q2) = (q1 + q2) 
1
 q2   c2q2:
The equilibrium outputs are
qi =
(2   1)
 (c1 + c2)
+1
(ci (1  ) + cj) ; with i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j:
10To the best of our knowledge, this comparative statics issue, which might be thought of as single-rm
taxation, has not been considered in the literature.
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The equilibrium prots are
i (c1; c2) =
(2   1) 1

(ci (1  ) + cj)2
(ci + cj)
+1
:
It is easily veried that
(i) @

i (c1;c2)
@ci
can be positive under some robust parameter conditions. In particular, @

i (c1;c2)
@ci

c1=c2
>
0 if 12 <  <
3
5 :
(ii) In the n rm symmetric version of this example with  > 0 , @@c > 0 (see Kimmel,
1992, and Février and Linnemer, 2004).
(iii) this example gives rise to two Cournot equilibria, one of which has each rm producing
zero output.
In light of this discussion and example, an insightful perspective on Proposition (5) is that,
by imposing one of the commonly used conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of
Cournot equilibrium, C3, one also obtains as a byproduct that the counter-intuitive results
on the e¤ects of uniform or unilateral cost increases (or uniform or individual taxation) do
not hold.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions C1-C3, Condition (8) is veried.
Proof. See Appendix.
We can then state that under the general assumptions C1-C3, the holder of a weak
patent prefers to license it out using a per-unit royalty licensing contract rather than a xed
fee contract. This result holds whether the patent holder is active in the (downstream) market
or not.
6.2 Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products
Consider an industry consisting of n single-product rms, with constant unit costs c1; c2; :::; cn:
Assume that the goods are imperfect substitutes. Denoting Di(p1; p2; :::; pn) the demand for
the good produced by rm i; its prot function and reaction correspondence are dened by
i(pi; p i) = (pi   ci)Di(pi; p i) and ri(p i) = argmax
pi
i(pi; p i)
We will say that the Bertrand oligopoly is symmetric if the demand functions are symmetric
and c1 = c2 = ::: = cn , c:
Let Si ,

(p1; p2; :::; pn) 2 Rn+ j Di(p1; p2; :::; pn) > 0
	
. We assume that for every rm i
B1 Di is twice continuously di¤erentiable on Si.
B2 (i)@Di@pi < 0, (ii)
@Di
@pj
> 0 and (iii)
Pn
k=1
@Di
@pk
< 0 over the set Si.
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B3 Di @Di@pj@pi  
@Di
@pj
@Di
@pi
> 0 over the set Si, for j 6= i.
B4
Pn
k=1
@2 logDi
@pi@pj
< 0 over the set Si.
These general conditions are commonly invoked for di¤erentiated-good demand systems
(e.g., Vives, 1999). They have the following meanings and economic interpretations. For B2,
part (i) is just the ordinary law of demand; Part (ii) says that goods i and j are substitutes;
and Part (iii) is a dominant diagonal condition for the Jacobian of the demand system. It
says that own price e¤ect on demand exceeds the total cross-price e¤ects. B3 says that each
demand has (di¤erentiably) strict log-increasing di¤erences in own price and any rivals price.
The exact economic interpretation is that the price elasticity of demand strictly increases in
any rivals price, which is a very natural assumption for substitute products (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990). B4 says that the Hessian of the log-demand system has a dominant diagonal,
which is a standard assumption invoked to guarantee uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 or Vives, 1999). B2(iii) and B4 hold that own e¤ects of price
changes dominate cross e¤ects, for the level and the Jacobian of demand, respectively.
The following proposition provides su¢ cient conditions for Assumptions A1-A5 and A1-
A5to hold in this framework of price competition.
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions B1-B4,
(a) The Bertrand game is of strict strategic complements and has a unique equilibrium.
(b) Firm is equilibrium price pi is increasing in cj for any j:
(c) Firm is equilibrium prot i is di¤erentiable in cj for any j:
(d) Firm is equilibrium prot i is increasing in cj for any j 6= i:
(e) Firm is equilibrium prot i is decreasing in ci:
If, in addition, the game is symmetric, then
(f) the unique Bertrand equilibrium is symmetric.
(g) the equilibrium price p increases in c and p
(c0) p(c)
c0 c  1 for all c0 > c:
(h) per-rm equilibrium prot  is di¤erentiable in c, and decreasing in c.
Proof. See Appendix.
We leave to the reader the task of matching the di¤erent parts of Proposition (7) to
Assumptions A1-A5 and A1-A5, as this step is quite similar to the Cournot case.
Anderson, DePalma and Kreider (2001) extends the analysis of the e¤ects of taxation
to Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products, and report analogous ndings as in
the Cournot case. Since Proposition (7) contains only intuitive results on the e¤ects of cost
changes on prots, one concludes that the standard assumptions for existence and uniqueness
of Bertrand equilibrium preclude any counter-intuitive e¤ects of taxation.
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions B1-B4, Condition (8) is veried.
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Proof. See Appendix.
We can then state that under the general assumptions B1-B4, the holder of a weak
patent prefers to license it out using a per-unit royalty licensing contract rather than a xed
fee contract (be it active or not in the market).
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that the "weakness" of a patent is an alternative justication for the use
of a per-unit royalty instead of a xed fee in a licensing scheme. A su¢ cient condition under
which the holder of a weak patent prefers to license out through a per-unit royalty rather
than a xed fee is provided and shown to be mild in the sense that it holds under weak
conditions for a Cournot oligopoly with homogenous goods and a Bertrand oligopoly with
heterogenous goods. A signicant di¤erence with respect to the literature on the licensing
of ironclad patents is that we get a clear-cut result on the comparison of a patent holders
prots under the two schemes, independent of the type of downstream competition, the
degree of di¤erentiation between products and whether the patent holder is active or not in
the downstream market, while varying any of these three features can overturn the outcome
of the comparison when ironclad patents are considered. Furthermore, our model generates
some testable predictions that might be worth investigating: First, our results suggest that
per-unit royalty licenses should be more prevalent in industries with a signicant proportion
of rms holding questionable patents, e.g., industries relying on some new patentable subject
matter (biotechnology, software, business methods,...). Second, if our predictions are correct
then under the presumption that the EPO is more stringent in checking the patentability
standards than the USPTO, the use of per-unit royalties should be more prevalent in the US
than in the EU.
8 References
Allison, J., Lemley, M., 1998. Empirical evidence on the validity of litigated patents. AIPLA
Quarterly Journal 26, 185-277.
Amir, R. (1996). Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games, Games and
Economic Behavior, 15, 132-148.
Amir, R. and V.E. Lambson, 2000. On the e¤ects of entry in Cournot markets. Review of
Economic Studies 67, 235-54.
Anderson, S., A. DePalma and B. Kreider (2001). Tax Incidence in Di¤erentiated Product
Oligopoly, Journal of Public Economics, 173-192.
19
Ayres and Klemperer, 1999. Limiting patenteesmarket power without reducing innovation
incentives: the perverse benets of uncertainty and non-injunctive remerdies. Michigan Law
Review 97, 985-999.
Beggs, A.W., 1992. The licensing of patents under asymmetric information. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 10, 171191.
Bousquet, A., Cremer, H., Ivaldi, M., Wolkowicz, M., 1998. Risk sharing in licensing. Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization 16, 535554.
Choi, J.P., 2001. Technology transfer with moral hazard. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 19, 249266.
Choi, J.P., 2010. Patent pools and cross-licensing in the shadow of patent litigation. Inter-
national Economic Review 51, 441-460.
Encaoua, D., Lefouili, Y., 2009. Licensing weak patents. The Journal of Industrial Economics
57, 492-525.
Farrell, J., Merges R.P., 2004. Incentives to challenge and defend patents: why litigation wont
reliably x patent o¢ ce errors and why administrative patent review might help. Berkeley
Technology Law Journal, Annual Review of Law and Technology 19.
Farrell, J., Shapiro, C., 2008, How strong are weak patents? American Economic Review 98,
1347-1369.
Février, P and L. Linnemer, 2004, Idiosyncratic shocks in a asymetric Cournot oligopoly,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, 6, 835-848.
Gallini, N.T., Wright, B.D., 1990. Technology transfer under asymmetric information. RAND
Journal of Economics, 21, 147160.
Giebe, T., Wolfstetter, E., 2008. License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and)
losers. Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 91-106,
IDEI Report, 2006, Objectives and Incentives at the European Patent O¢ ce, Institut dEconomie
Industrielle, Toulouse.
Kabiraj, T., 2004. Patent licensing in a leadership structure. Manchester School 72, 188205.
Kamien, M.I., 1992. Patent licensing. In: Aumann, R.J., Hart, S. (Eds.), Handbook of Game
Theory with Economic Applications. Elsevier Science, North Holland, pp. 331354.
Kamien, M.I., Oren, S.S., Tauman, Y., 1992. Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 21, 483508.
Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y., 1984. The private value of a patent: a game theoretic analysis.
Z. Nationalökon 4 (Supplement), 93118.
Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y., 1986. Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 471491.
Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y., 2002. Patent licensing: the inside story. Manchester School 70,
715.
20
Katz, M.L., Shapiro, C., 1985. On the licensing of innovations. RAND Journal of Economics
16, 504520.
Katz, M.L., Shapiro, C., 1986. How to license intangible property. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 101, 567589.
Kimmel, S., 1992, E¤ects of cost changes on oligopolistsprots, Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, 40, 4, 441-449.
Lemley, M., Shapiro, C., 2005, Probabilistic patents, Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 2,
75-98.
Macho-Stadler, I., Pérez-Castrillo, J.D., 1991. Contrats de licence et asymétrie dinformation.
Annales dEconomie et de Statistique 24, 189208.
Macho-Stadler, I., Martinez-Giralt, X., Pérez-Castrillo, J.D., 1996. The role of information
in licensing contract design. Research Policy 25, 2541.
Mejer, M., van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B., 2009. Economic Incongruities in the European
Patent System, ECARES working paper 2009-003.
Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., 1990. Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with
Strategic Complementarities. Econometrica 58(6), 1255-77.
Muto, S., 1993. On licensing policies in Bertrand competition. Games and Economic Behavior
5, 257267.
Novshek, W., 1985. On the existence of Cournot equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies L
(II), 8598.
Rockett, K., 1990. The quality of licensed technology. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 8, 559574.
Poddar, S., Sinha, U.B., 2002. The role of xed fee and royalty in patent licensing. Working
paper No. 0211.Department of Economics, National University of Singapore.
Poddar, S., Sinha, U.B., 2004. On patent licensing and spatial competition. Economic Record
80, 208218.
Rostoker, M., 1984. A survey of corporate licensing. IDEA: Journal of Law and Technology
24, 5992.
Saracho, A.I., 2002. Patent licensing under strategic delegation. Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy 11, 225251.
Seade, J., 1985. Protable cost increases and the shifting of taxation, The Warwick Economics
Research Paper Series.
Sen, D., 2002. Monopoly prot in a Cournot oligopoly. Economics Bulletin 4, 16.
Sen, D., 2005. On the coexistence of di¤erent licensing schemes. International Review of
Economics and Finance 14, 393-413.
Sen D., Tauman, Y., 2003. General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation. Games
and Economic Behavior 59, 163-186.
21
Shapiro, C., 1985. Patent licensing and R & D rivalry. American Economic Review, Papers
and Proceedings 75, 2530.
Shapiro, C., 2003. Antitrust limits to patent settlements. RAND Journal of Economics 34,
391-411.
Stamatopoulos, G., Tauman, Y., 2007. Licensing of a quality-improving innovation. Working
paper. Stony Brook University.
Topkis, D., 1998, Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton University Press.
Taylor, C., Silberstone, Z., 1973. The Economic Impact of the Patent System. Cambridge
Univ. Press, Cambridge.
Vives, X., 1990, Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities, Journal of Mathematical
Economics 19, 305-321.
Vives, X., 1999, Oligopoly pricing: old ideas and new tools, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Wang, X.H., 1998. Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model. Economic Letters
60, 5562.
Wang, X.H., 2002. Fee versus royalty licensing in a di¤erentiated Cournot duopoly. Journal
of Economics and Business 54, 253266.
Wang, X.H., Yang, B., 1999. On licensing under Bertrand competition. Australian Economic
Papers 38, 106119.
9 Appendix
Equilibria of the second stage subgame
a. Per-unit royalty scheme
Assume the patent holder makes a license o¤er (in the rst stage) involving the payment of a
per-unit royalty r 2 [0; ] :
Assume rst that r < : Let us show that in this case, any outcome with k  n  2 licensees
cannot be an equilibrium. We have already shown that a situation where not all rms buy a
license and no rm challenges the patent cannot be an equilibrium so we can focus on situations
with k  n  2 licensees and at least one non-licensee, which we denote by K, challenging the
patent. Any of the n k 1  1 non-licensees di¤erent from K has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate since it would get an expected prot of e(k+1; c +r)+(1  )e(n; c ) instead
of the strictly lower expected prot i(k; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  ) if it remains a non-
licensee. Thus, any equilibrium of the second stage subgame involves at least n   1 rms if
r < : The latter result extends to the case r =  if it is assumed that a rm which is indi¤erent
between getting a license at this royalty rate and not buying a license does purchase a license.
Let us now use this result to determine the equilibria for each value of r   :
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- If e(n; c    + r)  i(n   1; c    + r) + (1  )e(n; c   ) (which is shown later on
to be equivalent to r  r () where r () is dened in Proposition 1) then all rms buying a
license is an equilibrium. Moreover, a situation where all rms but one buy a license is not
an equilibrium. Thus, in this case, all rms purchasing a license is the unique equilibrium of
the second stage subgame.
- If e(n; c  + r) < i(n  1; c  + r)+ (1  )e(n; c  ) ((which is shown later on to be
equivalent to r () < r   where r () is dened in Proposition 1) then all rms but one buying
a license (and the remaining rm challenging the patents validity) are equilibria. Moreover,
these are the only equilibria since all rms purchasing a license is not an equilibrium.
b. Fixed fee scheme
Denoting F the xed fee each rm has to pay to get a license, all rms deciding to purchase
a license is an equilibrium of the second stage subgame if and only if:
e(n; c  )  F  i(n  1; c  ) + (1  )e(n; c  )
which can be rewritten as:
F  F () =  e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  )
All rms but one deciding to purchase a license is an equilibrium of the second stage subgame
if the following two conditions hold:
i(n  1; c  ) + (1  )e(n; c  )  e(n; c  )
and
 [e(n  1; c  )  F ] + (1  )e(n; c  )  i(n  2; c  ) + (1  )e(n; c  )
Thus, all rms but one deciding to purchase a license is an equilibrium if and only if:
F ()  F  Fn 1  e(n  1; c  )  i(n  2; c  )
Denoting Fk = e(k; c  )  i(k   1; c  ) for each k = 1; 2; ::; n, we can further show that
for any k = 1; 2; :::; n  2, a number k of rms accepting the license o¤er and the other n  k
rms refusing to do so is an equilibrium if and only if:
Fk+1  F  Fk
23
Moreover, all rms deciding not to buy a license is an equilibrium if and only if:
F  F1
If we assume that the sequence (Fk)1kn is decreasing, i.e. a rms willingness to pay for a
license (under ironclad patent protection) decreases with the number of licensees, and that a
rm which is indi¤erent between accepting and refusing the license o¤er buys a license, then
for any F  0, there is a unique equilibrium to the second stage subgame up to a permutation
of rms: all the equilibria of the second stage subgame involve the same number of licensees
(which allows to dene a "demand function" for licenses which is decreasing in the xed fee
F ). However, if (Fk)1kn is not decreasing then there might exist some values of F for which
there is either no (pure-strategy) equilibrium or multiple equilibria with di¤erent number of
licensees.
However, if we focus on small values of  and do not care about whether pure-strategy equi-
libria exist - and which one arises in case they do - if all rms accepting the license o¤er is
not an equilibrium (as in the present paper), then the problem of multiplicity or inexistence
of equilibria depicted does not a¤ect our analysis. The reason is that, to be sure that all rms
accepting a license is the unique equilibrium whenever it is an equilibrium, i.e. whenever
F  F (), we only need the inequality F ()  Fk to hold for any k = 1; 2; :::; n   1, which,
given that F () = Fn; is true if  is small enough, and more specically if
   =
min
1kn 1
Fk
Fn
Proof of Proposition 1
All rms accepting the payment of a per-unit royalty r is an equilibrium if and only if:
e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  )
which can be rewritten as:
g (r; )  e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r)  (1  )e(n; c  )  0
We have g (0; ) = 

e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  )   e(n; c)  i(n  1; c  )
  i(n  1; c)  i(n  1; c  ) > 0 and g (; ) = e(n; c) i(n 1; c) (1  )e(n; c 
) = (1  ) (e(n; c)  e(n; c  )) < 0: Combining this with g being continuous and strictly
decreasing in r yields: i/ the existence and uniqueness of a solution in r to the equation
g (r; ) = 0 (within the interval [0; [), which we denote by r () ; ii/ the equivalence between
g (r; )  0 and r  r () : Moreover g (r; ) is strictly increasing in  (for any r 2 [0; ])
because e(n; c   )   i(n   1; c    + r) > 0 (for any r 2 [0; ]), which entails that r ()
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is strictly increasing in . Furthermore, A5 ensures that the licensing revenue function r !
nrqe (n; c  + r) is strictly increasing in the neighborhood of 0 (its derivative at r = 0 being
qe (n; c  ) > 0). Hence, Since r () is continuous, increasing and has r (0) = 0; we can
conclude that, for  su¢ ciently small, the optimal per-unit royalty license accepted by all
rms involves the payment of the royalty rate r () :
Proof of Proposition 2
All rms accepting the payment of a pure xed fee F is an equilibrium if and only if:
e(n; c  + r)  i(n  1; c  + r) + (1  )e(n; c  )
which yields:
F  F ()   e(n; c  )  i(n  1; c  )
The optimal xed fee accepted by all rms is the solution to the maximization program
maxnF subject to the constraint F  F (), which is obviously F () :
Proof of Proposition 3
The licensing revenues from the optimal per-unit royalty scheme deterring litigation are given
by:
~Pr () = nr () q
e(n; c  + r ())
and the licensing revenues from the optimal xed fee licensing scheme deterring litigation are:
~PF () = nFn () = n

e (n; c  )  i (n  1; c  )
Since ~Pr (0) = ~PF (0) then ~Pr () > ~PF () for  su¢ ciently small if:
d ~Pr ()
d
j=0> d
~PF ()
d
j=0 (10)
which can be rewritten as:
nr0 (0) qe(n; c  ) > n e (n; c  )  i (n  1; c  )
because r (0) = 0: Moreover di¤erentiating at  = 0 the equation dening r (), that is,
e (n; c  + r ()) = i (n  1; c  + r ()) + (1  )e (n; c  )
we get:
r0 (0)
@e
@c
(n; c  ) = i (n  1; c  )  e (n; c  )
25
which yields:
r0 (0) =
i (n  1; c  )  e (n; c  )
@e
@c (n; c  )
Hence, (2) is equivalent to:
n
i (n  1; c  )  e (n; c  )
@e
@c (n; c  )
qe(n; c  ) > n e (n; c  )  i (n  1; c  )
which can be rewritten as:
@e
@c
(n; c  ) >  qe(n; c  )
because i (n  1; c  )  e (n; c  ) < 0:
Proof of Proposition 5
(a) The existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium follows from the contraction-like prop-
erty that every selection of ri satises (See Amir, 1996 or Amir and Lambson, 2000 for details)
 1 < ri(Q
0
 i)  ri(Q i)
Q0 i  Q i
< 0 for all Q0 i > Q i: (11)
(b) We rst show that qi is continuously di¤erentiable in ci: Viewed as a correspondence
in the parameter ci, qi is upper hemi-continuous (or u.h.c.), as a direct consequence of the
well-known property of u.h.c. of the equilibrium correspondence for games with continuous
payo¤ functions (jointly in own and rivals actions), see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990.
Since qi is also single-valued in c (from part (b)), q

i must be a continuous function. Then the
fact that qi is continuously di¤erentiable in ci follows from the Implicit Function Theorem
applied to the rst order conditions, and the smoothness of P ().
The fact that i is also continuously di¤erentiable in ci follows directly from the fact that
qi has the same property for all i.
The proof for the parameter cj ; j 6= i; follows along the same lines.
(c) Denote industry output, rm is output, prot and its rivalstotal outputs at equi-
librium by Q; qi ; 

i and Q

 i respectively when the cost vector is (c1; c2; :::; cn). Denote the
same four variables by bQ; bqi; bi and bQ i after rm is cost alone increases to bci > ci.
We rst show that bQ < Q. Adding the n rst order conditions at the Cournot equilibrium
yields
nP (Q) +QP 0 (Q) =
nX
k=1
ck (12)
Since the LHS of (12) is strictly decreasing in Q, the increase in rm is cost from ci to bci
increases the RHS of (12), which causes the solution to (12) to decrease. In other words,bQ < Q.
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We now show that for any rm j 6= i, we must have bQ j < Q j . To this end, rst observe
that bQ j + rj( bQ j) = bQ < Q = Q j + rj(Q j). Since (11) holds that Q j + rj(Q j) is
increasing in Q j , we must have bQ j < Q j .
To show that bj > j , consider for rm j,
bj = bqj [P (bqj + bQ j)  cj ]
 qj [P (qj + bQ j)  cj ] by the Cournot property
> qj [P (q

j +Q

 j)  cj ] since bQ j < Q j
= j
We now show that for rm i, we must have bQ i > Q i. To this end, rst observe that since
rj is strictly decreasing (cf. (11)) and bQ j < Q j , we have bqj = rj( bQ j) > rj(Q j) = qj , for
every rm j 6= i. Then since bQ i =Pj 6=i bqj and Q i =Pj 6=i qj , we have bQ i > Q i.
To show that i > bi, consider
i = q

i

P (qi +Q

 i)  ci

 bqi P (bqi +Q i)  ci by the Cournot property
> bqi[P (bqi + bQ i)  ci] since bQ i > Q i:
> bqi[P (bqi + bQ i)  bci] = bi:
The remaining part of the proof deals with the case of a symmetric Cournot oligopoly.
(d) Due to the symmetry of the game, asymmetric equilibria, if any, would come in n-
tuples. Hence, the conclusion follows from part (a) directly.
(e) Let q denote each rms equilibrium output. Di¤erentiating the rst order condition
with respect to c; we get:
@q
@c

(n+ 1)P 0 (nq) + nqP" (nq)

= 1 (13)
Using the rst order condition and C3, it is easy to see that the term in brackets is strictly
negative, it follows that @q

@c < 0.
We now show that per-rm prot decreases in c. Denote the equilibrium variables by
qi ; 

i and Q

 i when the unit cost is c, and by q
0
i; 
0
i and Q
0
 i the same variables when the
unit cost is c0 > c:
27
Di¤erentiating i = q
 [P (nq)  c] with respect to c yields
@i
@c
=
@q
@c
[P (nq)  c] + q

P 0(nq)n
@q
@c
  1

(14)
=
@q
@c
(n  1)qP 0(nq)  q by (??)
=  q 2P
0(Q) +QP" (Q)
(n+ 1)P 0 (Q) +QP" (Q)
by (13)
Clearly, C3 implies that 2P 0(Q) + QP" (Q) < 0 for all Q, so the numerator in the above
fraction is < 0. It is then easy to see that the denominator is then also < 0. Hence @

i
@c < 0:
Proof of Proposition 6
Let us show that (8) holds (which will imply that both Condition (6) and Condition (7)
are satised).
We have:
 = (P (Q)  ci) qi +
X
j 6=i
(P (Q)  cj) qj
then:
@
@ci
=

P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
  1

qi + (P (Q
)  ci) @q

i
@ci
+
X
j 6=i

P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
qj + (P (Q
)  cj)
@qj
@ci

which can be rewritten as:
@
@ci
=  qi +
X
j

P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
qj + (P (Q
)  cj)
@qj
@ci

When ci = cj = c, the latter becomes:
@
@ci
=  qi +
X
j

P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
qj + (P (Q
)  c) @q

j
@ci

=  qi + P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
X
j
qj + (P (Q
)  c)
X
j
@qj
@ci
=  qi + P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
:Q + (P (Q)  c) @Q

@ci
=  qi|{z}
direct e¤ect
+
@Q
@ci

P 0(Q):Q + (P (Q)  c)| {z }
strategic e¤ect
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Adding the n rst order conditions at the Cournot equilibrium yields
nP (Q) +QP 0 (Q) =
nX
k=1
ck = nc
Thus,
P 0(Q):Q + (P (Q)  c) = n  1
n
P 0(Q):Q < 0
Moreover, we have already shown (see the proof of Prop. 4) that @Q

@ci
< 0. It then follows
that:
@Q
@ci

P 0(Q):Q + (P (Q)  c) > 0
which yields:
@
@ci
>  qi
Proof of Proposition 7
First note that for rm i, charging a price of ci strictly dominates charging any price
strictly below ci. Hence, we restrict attention to the price space [ci;1) as the action set for
rm i; i = 1; 2; :::; n. Then the transfomed prot function log i(pi; p i) is well dened.
(a) For the proof that the game with log-prots as payo¤s is of strict strategic complements,
observe that, due to B3, each payo¤ i(pi; p i) satises @2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@p i > 0. Hence,
by the strong version of Topkiss Theorem (see Amir, 1996 or Topkis, 1998 p. 79), every
selection of ri(p i) is strictly increasing in p i. It follows directly from the property of
strategic complements, via Tarskis xed point theorem, that the Bertrand equilibrium set is
nonempty. Uniqueness then follows from a well known argument from B4 (for details, see
Milgrom and Roberts 1990, pp. 1271-1272, or Vives, 1999 pp. 149-150).
(b) To show that for any rm j, the equilibrium price pj is increasing in ci, note rst that
the price game is log-supermodular (from part (a)). In addition, for player i, log i(pi; p i) =
log(pi ci)+logDi(pi; p i) has increasing di¤erences in (pi; ci) since @2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@ci =
(pi   ci) 2 > 0, and the constraint set [ci;1) is clearly ascending in ci. For any player
k 6= i, log k(pk; p k) is independent of ci, so has increasing di¤erences in (pk; ci) since
@2 log k(pk; p k)=@pk@ci = 0: So the unique equilibrium price vector (p1; p2; :::; pn) is in-
creasing in ci by [Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Theorem 6].
(c) We rst show that every equilibrium price pi is continuously di¤erentiable in cj , for all
i and j: Viewed as a correspondence in the parameter cj , pi is u.h.c., by the u.h.c. property
of the equilibrium correspondence for games with continuous payo¤ functions (jointly in own
and rivalsactions), see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990. Since pi is also single-valued in cj
(from part (i)), pi is a continuous function. Then the fact that p

i is continuously di¤erentiable
in cj follows from the Implicit Function Theorem. Finally, continuous di¤erentiability of i
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follows from that of all the p0i s.
(d) Di¤erentiating i = (p

i   ci)Di(pi ; p i) with respect to cj , for i 6= j, yields
@i
@cj
=
@pi
@cj
Di(p

i ; p

 i) + (p

i   ci)
X
k
@Di
@pk
@pk
@cj
(15)
Using the rst order condition Di(pi ; p

 i) + (p

i   ci)@Di@pi = 0, (15) reduces to
@i
@cj
= (pi   ci)
X
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
@pk
@cj
 0
since @Di@pk > 0 (goods are substitutes) and
@pk
@cj
 0 from part (b).
(e) We rst show that the slopes of pj in ci are all  1, for j = 1; 2; :::; n. With the
change of variable zj = pj  ci, j = 1; 2; :::; n, the log-prot functions of rm i and rm
k 6= i are log ei(zi; z i) , log zi + logDi(zi + ci; z i + ci) and log ek(zk; z k) , log(zk +
ci) + logDk(zk + ci; z k + ci): With these new action variables, the game is easily seen to
remain supermodular. In addition, log ei(zi; z i) has decreasing di¤erences in (zi; ci), since
@ log ei(zi;z i)
@zi@ci
=
P
k
@2 logDi
@pk@pi
< 0 by B4; and log ek(zk; z k) for k 6= i has decreasing di¤erences
in (zk; ci), since
@ log ek(zi;z i)
@zk@ci
=  1
(zk+ci)2
+
P
j
@2 logDk
@pj@pk
< 0 by B4. Hence by [Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), Theorem 6], the unique equilibrium (z1 ; z2 ; :::; zn) is decreasing in ci, the
action set zj 2 [ cj ;1) being descending in cj , for each j. This is equivalent to the slopes
of pj in ci being all  1, since zj = pj  ci, for all j. Combining with part (b), we get
0  p(c0) p(c)c0 c  1 for all c0 > c.
The FOC for maximizing rm is (log-transformed) prot in the p variables is
1
pi   ci
+
@ logDi(p1; p2; :::; pn)
@pi
= 0 (16)
Di¤erentiating log i w.r.t. ci yields
@ log i
@ci
=
@pi
@ci
  1
pi   ci
+
X
k
@ logDi
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
=  

@pi
@ci
  1

@ logDi
@pi
+
X
k
@ logDi
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
by (16)
=
@ logDi
@pi
+
X
k 6=i
@ logDi
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
 @ logDi
@pi
+
X
k 6=i
@ logDi
@pk
using B2(ii) and 0  @p

k
@ci
 1
< 0 by B2(iii).
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(f) When the Bertrand game is symmetric, the unique Bertrand equilibrium must be
symmetric, for otherwise equilibria would come in pairs.
(g) That the equilibrium price p increases in c follows from the same argument as for part
(b) in view of the fact that log i has increasing di¤erences in (pi; c) since @2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@c =
(pi   c) 2 > 0. To show that p has all slopes in c less than 1, use the change of variable
zi = pi   c for each i, so that rm is payo¤ becomes log zi + logDi(zi + c; z i + c), which is
easily seen to have decreasing di¤erences in (zi; c) since
P
k
@ logDi
@pk@pi
< 0 by B4. By [Milgrom
and Roberts (1990), Theorem 6], z is decreasing in c, which is equivalent to p having all
slopes in c less than 1.
(h) From an argument similar to the proof of part (c), p and thus  = (p c)Di(p; p; :::; p)
are di¤erentiable with respect to c. The FOC at a symmetric Bertrand equilibrium is
1
p   c +
@ logDi(p
; :::; p)
@pi
= 0 (17)
Di¤erentiating log  w.r.t. c yields
@ log 
@c
=
@p
@c   1
p   c +
X
k
@ logDi
@pk
:
@p
@c
=  

@p
@c
  1

@ logDi
@pi
+
X
k
@ logDi
@pk
:
@p
@c
by (17)
=
@ logDi
@pi
+
X
k 6=i
@ logDi
@pk
:
@p
@c
 @ logDi
@pi
+
X
k 6=i
@ logDi
@pk
by B2(ii) and Part (g)
< 0 by B2(iii).
Proof of Proposition 8
Let us show that Condition (8) holds (which will imply that both Condition (6) and
Condition (7) are satised).
We have:
 = (pi   ci)Di +
X
j 6=i
 
pj   cj

Dj
31
then:
@
@ci
=

@pi
@ci
  1

Di + (p

i   ci)
@Di
@ci
+
X
j 6=i

@pj
@ci
Dj + (p

i   ci)
@Dj
@ci

which can be rewritten as:
@
@ci
=  Di +
X
j

@pj
@ci
Dj +
 
pj   cj
 @Dj
@ci

=  Di +
X
j
"
@pj
@ci
Dj +
 
pj   cj
X
k
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
#
=  Di +
X
j
24@pj
@ci
Dj +
 
pj   cj
 @Dj
@pj
:
@pj
@ci
+
 
pj   cj
X
k 6=j
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
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=  Di +
X
j
26664@p

j
@ci

Dj +
 
pj   cj
 @Dj
@pj

| {z }
=0
+
 
pj   cj
X
k 6=j
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
37775
=  Di +
X
j
24 pj   cjX
k 6=j
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
35
We have already shown that @p

k
@ci
> 0 for any k; i (see the proof for part (b) of Prop. 5).
Moreover, we have @Dj@pk > 0 for any j 6= k (from B2(ii)). It then follows that:
@
@ci
>  Di =  qi
This proof establishes a result which is actually more general than Condition (8). Indeed, it
is shown that for any (c1; c2; :::; cn) :
@
@ci
(c1; c2; :::; cn) >  qi (c1; c2; :::; cn) (18)
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